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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

LEGER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

CASE NO. 13737

ROBERTS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent,
vs.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY,
Defendant-Added.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant, Leger Construction Company [Leger]
commenced this action against defendant-respondent, Roberts,
Inc. [Roberts], claiming $2,782.00 allegedly due Leger from
Roberts under the terms of a subcontract whereby Roberts had
agreed to perform mechanical work on Utah State maintenance
stations located at Salt Lake City and Manila, Utah.

Roberts

(1) counterclaimed for $14,172.04 owed to it under the con-
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tract, plus interest and attorney's fees; (2) joined Leger's
surety, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company [USF&G]
as an added defendant; and (3) claimed $3,249.77 due from
Leger on other jobs.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft,
District Judge, who filed a memorandum decision.

Thereafter

findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered.

A

joint and several judgment was entered against plaintiff and
its surety on defendants first claim in the sum of $8,494.95,
and against plaintiff only on defendant's second claim for
$782.25.

Motions were made by plaintiff and defendant to

amend the findings and conclusions, make additional findings
and conclusions and amend the judgment accordingly.

Plain-

tiff's motions were denied and defendant's motion was granted
to award it attorney's fees of $2,607.50 against plaintiff
and the surety on defendant's first claim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment
of the District Court.
It should be noted that plaintiff seeks a reversal
". . . for and on behalf of its surety • . ." (Appellant's
Brief P. 2 ) . However, USF&G has not filed a notice of

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appeal and it is respondent's contention that the judgment
against it is final.

This matter will be treated in respon-

dent's argument.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in appellant's brief is not
complete, failing to include much of the pertinent evidence
upon which the trial court's decision was based.

For that

reason, respondent will state the facts as it sees them in
the record.
Leger and Roberts entered into a contract entitled "Bid
and Contract" dated August 9, 1971 (Exhibit 2-P), under which
Roberts was to perform mechanical and plumbing work on
maintenance stations at Salt Lake City and Manila, Utah.
The contract price was $70,591.00. The maintenance stations
were owned by the Utah State Building Board and were to be
used by the Utah State Highway Department (Exhibit 22-P).

In

connection with its contract with the Building Board, Leger,
as principal, and USF&G, as surety, executed and delivered
to the State of Utah a labor and material payment bond
pursuant to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Section
5, U.C.A. 1953 (as amended).

(Finding of Fact No. 5 ) .

Although the agreement between Leger and Roberts was
dated August 9, 1971, both George L. Leger, president of

•.

'

- • •

:
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'

.
,

•

.

•

;

- ' . - .

•

:

i
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f

Leger, and Larry P. Roberts, president of Roberts, agree
that the document was actually signed a week or more after
the ninth (Tr. 1st day, p. 7; Tr. 2nd day, p. 66).
Under the contract (Exhibit 2-P) Roberts agreed to:
. . . actually move onto the job, with all
necessary tools, supplies and equipment,
within (2) two working days after receiving
written or oral notice and to start and carry on the work uninterrupted to completion
of the stage directed by the general contractor.
Roberts commenced work on the Salt Lake maintenance station
on August 4, 1971, five days prior to the date on the contract (Exhibit 17-P).

The first work noted on Roberts' daily

log (Exhibit 17-P) on the Manila maintenance station was
September 7, 1971. Larry Roberts, however, testified that he
took material to that job one day after Ned Oaks, Leger's
foreman, requested the material in the latter part of August,
1971.

George L. Leger testified that the Manila job was

ready for installation of certain radiant heating pads on
September 4, 1971 (a Saturday), that Roberts was "aware of
that fact on the 4th" and that the work was not commenced
until September 14, 1971 (Tr. 1st day, p. 50). As noted
above, Roberts1 daily log shows that its employees were on
the Manila job on Tuesday, September 7, which was the first
working day after September 4 since Monday, September 6 was
Labor Day.
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According to George L. Leger, the major portions of
the work to be performed by Roberts consisted of the installation of underground piping and of radiant heating
pads (Tr. 1st day, p. 10). Installation of the radiant
heating pads was commenced at the Salt Lake job on October
9, 1971 (Finding of Fact No. 36) . George Leger maintained
that the Salt Lake project was ready for this pad on August
27, 1971, and that Roberts was so informed (Tr. 1st day,
p. 10). The evidence shows that employees of Roberts spent
136.5 man hours on the Salt Lake job between August 27 and
October 8, 1971 (Exhibit P-17).

These radiant heating pads

were complete by November 11, 1971, but primarily because
of leaking valves the system was not finished until December 5, 1971 (Finding of Fact No. 36). These valves were
specified in the plans and specifications furnished to
Roberts (Finding of Fact No. 46).
The weather conditions during this period hampered
completion of the pads (Tr. 2nd day, p. 37). In fact, Tom
Patterson, the mechanical inspector for the Utah State
Building Board, even suggested that Roberts wait until the
roof was on the building before completing the pads (Tr. 2nd
day, p. 37). As of November 22, 1971, the structural steel
upon which the roof was to be placed was complete (Tr. 1st

-5-
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day, p. 65), but zero percent of the roof itself was complete
on that date (Exhibit 1.2-D) . According to the "Draw Request"
submitted to the Utah State Building Board by Leger and
signed by George L. Leger, no work had been done on the
roofing and sheet metal, drywall, ceramic tile, floor covering, flat concrete, overhead doors, locker and toilet partitions, fence, landscaping, hoist, painting and calking as of
November 22 (Exhibit 12-D).

The electrical was 35% complete,

hollow metal and hardware 10%, windows, glass and glazing
60%, pump equipment 40%, building material 60%, and carpenter labor 65% (Exhibit 12-D).
complete (Exhibit 12-D).

Roberts1 mechanical work was 7

It was obvious at that time that

the job was not going to be finished by November 30, 1971.
At trial, George L. Leger, on cross-examination, admitted that Roberts did not prevent the roof from being installed (Tr. 1st day, p. 65). He said that the rough plumbing, boiler, gas pump, water line, and toilet facilities,
all installed by Roberts, did not hold up the job (Tr. 1st
day, pp. 65-67).

At that point the trial judge asked George

Leger "Is it your claim the delay is based solely upon the
heating pad?"

To which Leger answered:

"Yes, sir."

Appellant goes to great lengths in its brief in an
attempt to show that Roberts did not diligently pursue its
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work on the Salt Lake job from October 27, through the
end of November, 1971. Appellant claims that the weather
records show rain on only eleven days during this period five of which were either Saturdays or Sundays (Appellant's
Brief, p. 7 ) . What appellant overlooks in his persual of
the weather report (Exhibit 46-P) is that on October 27,
5.8 inches of snow fell and that snow continued to fall so
that on the 28th day there were 6 inches on the ground; on
the 29th, 2 inches; and on the 30th (Saturday), 2 inches.
Again on October 31 (Sunday), 8.5 inches of snow fell so
that on November 1, 7 inches were on the ground; 5 inches
on the 2nd; 3 inches on the 3rd; and 2 inches on the 4th
(Exhibit 46-P).

In fact the records of the Utah State

Building Board (Exhibit 48-P) show that only Roberts was
on the job on October 28 and that the next work done by
anyone was on November 8, 1971. Obviously there was sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could find that
the weather delayed progress on the job during this period.
Eliminating the first seven days of November, only 16 working days remained in the month and an examination of Exhibits 17-P (Roberts' records) and 48-P (the Building Board's
record) shows that Roberts had men on the job for eight of
those days, for a total of 64 man hours. Exhibit 48-P also
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shows that no one worked on the job on Friday, November 26,
the day after Thanksgiving.

Four inches of snow fell on

November 14 (Exhibit 46--P) .
Although George Leger testified that the Salt Lake
project was ready for installation of the radiant heating
pads on August 27, 1971, (Tr. 1st day, p. 10), Larry Roberts
testified that he took photographs of the site on October
10, 1971 (Exhibits 30-36D) and the earth was not in a condition which would enable Roberts to install its pipe at
that time (Tr. 2nd day, p. 76). In fact, Roberts had to
remove pipe which had already been installed in order for
Leger to "get in and do the final grade."

(Tr. 2nd day, p.

76) ;-;-':-v>::S--;;:^-;:

Certain back charges were made by the Utah State Building Board against Leger on account of mechanical work at
the Salt Lake shed.

These included $2,633.00 for a gas

line which was installed by Mountain Fuel Supply and which
was paid for by the Building Board (Finding of Fact No. 24, R.
p. 33). A dispute existed as to who was responsible for
installation of this line and two or three meetings with
state officials did not resolve the dispute (Finding of Fact
No. 27, R. p. 35). The trial court found that the gas line
was Roberts1 responsibility and allowed Leger an offset for
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the cost (Finding of Fact No. 24, R. pp. 33-34).
Similarly, the installation of "plug valves" and a
stack which did not meet specifications was taken into
consideration by the trial court and offsets totaling
$584.22 against the balance due Roberts allowed (Findings of
Fact Nos. 20 & 23, R. pp. 32 & 33).
When Roberts was not paid the balance of the contract
price, it refused to do certain warranty work and the trial
court allowed Leger to offset $268.70 because of this (Finding of Fact No. 22, R. p. 33).
The radiant heating pad at Manila was complete on October 15, 1971 (Tr. 1st day, p. 50). Thereafter, Leger poured
the concrete for the floors and then progress on the job
". . . pretty well stopped . . . " according to George Leger
because of a bad snow storm (Tr. 1st day, p. 51). Very little
was done on that job until December 1, 1971, at which time
Leger commenced the framing of the office area (Tr. 1st day,
pp. 51-52).
Respondent also claimed monies from Leger (but not from
USF&G) on a number of other jobs.

The trial court awarded

$782.25 on these claims (R. p. 26) and appellant apparently
does not dispute this award.

• 1

-9-
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ARGUMENT
•• I

••

THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
ROBERTS AND LEGER IS INVALID AS A PENALTY*
Paragraph "(p)" of the contract between plaintiff and
defendant (see Ex. 3-P), provided:
The work shall be commenced upon written
or oral order to proceed and completed within
the time stated in this bid. If the work is
not completed in accordance with the foregoing,
it is understood that the general contractor
will suffer damage and it being impractical and
unfeasible to determine the amount of actual
damage, it is agreed that I will pay on demand,
to the general contractor, as fixed and liquidated damages and not as penalty, the sum of
$50.00 for each calendar day of delay until
the work is completed and accepted. Extension
of time shall be granted, when asked for in
writing, when it is, in the judgment of the
general contractor, not practical or impossible
or because of unforeseeable causes beyond control and without fault or negligence on my behalf, to complete said work in the specified
time. (Above causes including but not restricted to strikes, war, acts of God, acts of the
Government, acts of the owner, acts of another
contractor in the performance of a contract with
the owner, and adverse weather conditions).
I recognize the general contractor has a
completion date guarantee in his contract with
the owner that calls for completion on or before
Nov. 30, 1971.
In addition to the liquidated damages, I
agree to pay the general contractor an amount
equal to his cost in maintaining a field office
and supervision over the work for each day beyond
the specified completion date if it is determined
that I caused this delay, because: I recognize

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

and agree that the general contractor's costs are
directly proportional to the length of the construction period, and therefore shall reimburse
the general contractor for all days beyond the
specified completion date, whether an extension
of time is granted or not.
The validity of a liquidated damage provision is dependent on whether the sum stipulated is deemed liquidated
damages or a penalty.

Parties are bound by a stipulation

for liquidated damages, but a penalty is unenforceable,
Russell v. Ogden Union Railroad & Depot Co., 122 Utah 107,
247 P.2d 257, 263 (1952), and the nondefaulting party is
left to recovery of the actual damages he can prove.

Use Qf

the terms "liquidated damges" or "penalty" by the parties is
not controlling, but the provision is to be construed by
considering all the circumstances at the time the parties
executed the contract.

Croft v. Jensen, 86 Utah 13, 40 P.2d

198 (1935) .
In Perkins v. Spencer, 141 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, 447
(1952), this court examined numerous Utah cases which considered the matter of liquidated damages and concluded:
. . .[I]n all cases where the stipulation for
liquidated damages was enforced it bore some
reasonable relation to the actual damages which
could reasonably be anticipated at the time the
contract was made and was not a forfeiture which
would allow an unconscionable and exhorbitant recovery. (Emphasis added).
This court also noted itfs agreement with the view summar-
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ized in the Restatement, Contracts, §339 (1932) :
(1) An agreement made in advance of breach,
fixing the damages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the
damages recoverable for the breach, unless
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable
forecase of just compensation for the harm
that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach '
is one that is incapable or very difficult of
accurate estimation*
In the instant case, the contract provision for "liquidated damages" must be held void as a penalty.

The actual

damages caused by delay were capable of accurage calculation,
and in fact the parties specifically provided for their calculation and payment in paragraph "(p)".

At the time the

parties entered into their agreement they anticipated that
the damages occasioned by a delay in performance would
amount to the general contractor's costs in maintaining a
field office and providing supervision over the work for
each day beyond the completion date.

The parties agreed

that if Roberts was at fault for the delay he would pay
these additional costs and expenses.

Using this informa-

tion, a court could have easily calculated the amount of
actual damage occasioned by any delay in performance.

The

provision for the additional payment of $50.00 per day as
"liquidated damages" does not contemplate any unforeseen
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damages which would not be fully compensated by the payment
of the general contractor's costs and expenses*

Thus, in

light of the circumstances and expectations of the parties,
the "liquidated damages" provision must be construed as an
additional "penalty" and as such should be held to be void
and unenforceable.
It should be noted that the provisions of the first
paragraph of paragraph "(p)" of the August 9, 1971, contract
do not necessarily require any real delay by the subcontractor.
The subcontractor is required to pay Fifty Dollars ($50.00)
per day regardless of the cause for delay if no extension is
granted by the general contractor.

Under the terms of the

paragraph extensions of time shall be granted, ". . . when
asked for in writing, when it is. . . not practical or
impossible or because of unforeseeable causes beyond control
and without fault or negligence on my behalf, to complete
said work in the specified time."

Then the contract indi-

cates that such causes include strikes, war, acts of God,
the Government, the owner, other contractors or the weather.
The last paragraph of paragraph "(p)" provides that the
subcontractor will pay actual costs of supervision and field
office expenses if it is determined that he actually caused
a delay regardless of whether an extension is granted.
Thus, under this contract, a subcontractor is absolutely
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liable for actual damages caused by his delay, regardless of
any extension granted by the general contractor and, unless
an extension is granted, he is also liable for Fifty Dollars
($50.00) per day when delay is caused by acts of God, Government or other third parties.

This clearly constitutes a

penalty.
Paragraph " (q)" of the contract states:

"Time required

to complete this contract will be

working days."

number is inserted in the blank space.

Paragraph "(p)"

No

requires the work to be completed " . . . within the time
stated . . . "

and indicates that the general contractor had

agreed to complete the job by November 30, 1971. There is
no other time mentioned anywhere in the contract.

Paragraph

"(q)" is obviously included in the contract to provide the
subcontractor with a maximum number of days in which to
complete his work.

Although the subcontractor has notice of

the general contractors completion date, he must nevertheless
be given some specified amount of time in which to complete
his work.

What, for example, would be the result if the

general contractor did not notify the subcontractor to
proceed until November 29, 1971?

Would the subcontractor

then be required to pay Fifty Dollars ($50.00) unless a
written extension was requested and received?
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-l 4 -

II
THE ERRORS ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANT ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY
SUBSTANTIAL OR PREJUDICIAL TO WARRANT A REVERSAL OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND APPELLANT FAILED TO INTERPOSE TIMELY OBJECTIONS TO. THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS.
The appellant has alleged that the trial judge committed numerous errors. Many of these alleged errors are
contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
filed by the Honorable Judge Croft.

For example, appellant

alleges error in findings 34 and 42 with respect to the
extent of plaintiff's claim of delay, in finding 36 concerning the omission of fact as to when Roberts was told to
start work on the Salt Lake shed, in finding 31 concerning
the amount of precipitation which fell during the disputed
period, in finding 45 concerning the commencement of work on
the walls and roof of the sheds by Leger, and other such
errors.

In the interest of economy these errors in the

findings will be considered together.
A.

Appellant failed to interpose timely objection

to the alleged errors.
After the entry of the original findings of fact and
conclusions of law and judgments on March 19, 1974, (R. pp.
27 and 25) appellant filed a motion to amend the findings
and conclusions and to enter an amended judgment (R. pp.
21-22).

The only error mentioned in this motion, concerns

^
•:•'••
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;

H

the amount of delay claimed by Leger (R. p. 21) . With the
exception of this one alleged error, the remaining errors
which appellant now raises were never presented or brought
to the trial court's attention.
This court, on numerous occasions, has held that a
party must give the trial court an opportunity to correct
alleged error before asking for and receiving a reversal
in a reviewing court.

E.g., Drummond v. Union Pac. R.R.,

111 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903, 909 (1947); Hube.r v. Newman,
106 Utah 363, 145 P.2d 780, 782-83 (1944); Porcupine
Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Co., 15 Utah 2d 318, 392
P.2d 620, 621 (1964).

If the objections urged on appeal

were not urged in the trial court, this court has refused
to consider them absent a showing of special circumstances.
Steele v. Wilkinson, 10 Utah 2d 159, 349 P.2d 1117, 1119
(1960); Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185,
186 (1954).
In Keller v. Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.2d 118 (1953)
defendant appealed from an adverse judgment in a partnership dissolution and accounting contest contending that the
court had erred in not particularly specifying certain
items in its findings of fact.

The defendant proposed

certain amendments to the findings but advanced different
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exceptions on appeal.

In refusing to review the appellant's

new exceptions this court stated:
If these items had been brought to the
attention of the trial court at the proper
time, a proper correction, if called for,
would no doubt have been made. Defendant,
however, not only made no objections to the
findings before they were signed, but he
raised none of these questions in his motion
for a new trial. Hence, he cannot now be
permitted to criticize the findings for ambiguity, inexplicity, or uncertainty., [citations omitted]. Such objections, now made
on appeal, come too late. 255 P.2d at 119.
Similarly, in Westerfield v. Coop, 6 Utah 2d 262, 311
P.2d 787, 787-88 (1957) where appeal was from a judgment
for back alimony and support money which had been awarded
in a California divorce decree, this court announced:
The Utah court took it upon itself to
make findings apportioning the California
judgment among the plaintiff and 3 children
equally, though the California court had
awarded an unapportioned monthly lump sum.
There was no seasonable objection directed
toward said finding, and we will not entertain such objection for the first time on
appeal.
The only recognized exception to this rule is where
the appellant had no opportunity to make an objection or
amendment at the trial level.

In the instant case, appel-

lant not only had the opportunity to object, but specifically filed a motion to amend the court's findings.

-17-
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In

light of these facts, appellant has waived any right to seek
a reversal in this court on grounds which were not properly
raised or presented in the trial court.
B.

Failure to move for new trial precludes review of

the errors.
A second ground necessitating a refusal to review
appellant's alleged errors is the failure of appellant to
seek a new trial in the lower court.

Pursuant to Rule 59,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may seek a new trial
by filing a motion within 10 days after the entry of judgment.

In an action tried without a jury, the court may open

the judgment, take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law, make new findings and direct
the entry of a new judgment.

Among other grounds, Rule 59

specifically recognizes "insufficiency of the evidence to
justify a decision" and "error in law," as sufficient cause
for the granting of a new trial.

The rule serves an import-

ant policy; it enables the trial court to review the evidence
and his conclusions with respect thereto, when the evidence
is still fresh, thus providing a more accurate and meaningful evaluation of the facts. Moreover, the motion
preserves the integrity of the trial court by encouraging
a self-induced correction of error.
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In Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n,, 24 Utah 2d 292,
470 P.2d 393, 396-97 (1970) this court held that plaintiffls
failure to move for a new trial, so that the trial court
could correct the verdict rendered by the jury, precluded a
review of the verdict in the appellate court.

In so holding,

this court saw the scope of its review in examining the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict as one to
review the actions of the trial court, not the jury, and to
review only those issues raised below.

While appellate

courts are usually more willing to review decisions of the
trier of fact when that function is occupied by a judge
rather than by a jury, the reviewing court should not pass
judgment on the evidence when the alleged error has not been
called to the judge's attention by a proper motion.

The

trial judge is in a preferred position to weigh the facts,
and determinations concerning the evidence should be presented to the trial court before a reviewing court is called
on to make its evaluation of the evidence.

Many of Utah's

neighboring jurisdictions have recognized this aspect of
judicial restraint and have refused to review questions
concerning the sufficiency of evidence to support findings
of fact absent a motion for new trial in the court below.
E.g., Andrews v. Hand, 190 Kan. 109, 372 P.2d 559, 562
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cert, denied, 371 U.S. 880 (1962); Hyre v. Pratt, 382 P.2d
18, 21 (Okla. 1963); Noice v. Jorgensen, 151 Colo. 459, 378
P.2d 834, 837 (1963); Bushard v. Washoe County, 68 Nev. 217,
229 P.2d 156, 157 (1951).

Since the appellant made no motion

for new trial and gave the trial court no opportunity to
correct the alleged errors, this court should not seek to
review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings.
£•

The decision of the trial court on the evidence

should be sustained.
Even if this court should determine that a review of
the evidence and findings is proper, an examination of the
evidence will lead this court to the conclusion that the
findings of fact and conclusions of law were not erroneous.
Previously, this court had announced the rule that because
of the trial court's advantaged position, substantial deference must be given to its findings with respect to
the evidence.

E.g., First Sec. Bank v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d

24, 504 P.2d 995, 996 (1972); Elton v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972); Peterson v.
Holloway, 8 Utah 2d 328, 334 P.2d 559, 561-62 (1959).

In

Nokes v. Continental Min. & Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d 177, 308
P. 2d 954, 954-55 (1957) this court was called upon to review a question of fact in an equity matter.
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In doing so,

this court said:
Where there is a conflict in the evidence,
the finding of the trial court will not be disturbed if the evidence preponderates in favor
of the finding; nor, if the evidence thereon is
evenly balanced or if is doubtful where the preponderance lies; nor, even if its weight is
slightly against the finding of the trial court,
but it will be overturned and another finding
made only if the evidence clearly preponderates
against his finding.
The rule just stated is based upon the sound
reasoning that some credit should be indulged in
favor of the findings of the trial court because
of the advantages peculiar to his position in immediate contract with the trial. It is indeed
often true that, "the manner hath more eloquence
than naked words portend." There are intangibles
of expression and attitude which give color and
meaning not apparent from words alone. The trial
judge feels the impact of the personalities of
the parties and the witnesses: He is able to observe their appearance and behavior; their forthrightness or hesitancy in answering; their frankness and candor, or lack of it. Similarly revealing to him are indications of surprise, anger,
resentment or vindictiveness, pleasure or other
emotions which may be discerned from expressions
of the countenance or voice. He also has some
advantage in appraising their abilities to understand and their capacities to remember. Furthermore, he is in a position to question the witness
himself to clarify doubtful points or verify his
impressions on the matters just mentioned. All
of this combines to afford him better insight as
to the truthfulness of the testimony offered than
does a persual of the cold record. It is a sound
and well recognized policy of the law to repose
some confidence in the verity of the actions of
the trial court, and not to interfere with them
unless it clearly appears that he is in error.
Applying this principal, this court has upheld the trial
court findings unless clearly against the weight of the evi-
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dence, Harthy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28,
29 (1972), where they were supported by clear, satisfactory,
and convincing proof, Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427,
367 P.2d 464,. 468 (1962); Martin v. Martin, 29 Utah 2d 413,
510 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1973), where bolstered by substantial
evidence and reasonable inference, Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah
2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142, 1145 (1973), and where they were
founded on competent evidence, Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah
2d 370, 510 P.2d 526, 527 (1973).
These same standards for review have also been applied
in situations involving contract disputes.

In Casey v.

Nelson Bros. Const. Co., 24 Utah 2d 14, 465 P.2d 173, 174
(1970) where plaintiff recovered a judgment for the balance
due on a subcontract with the defendant, the defendant
sought to attack the judgment on grounds that the evidence
did not support the court's findings.

Responding to this

contention this court said:
The answers to the defendant's contentions
are found in the so-often repeated rule: that
where there is dispute in the evidence we assume
that the trial court believed those aspects of
the evidence, and drew the inferences which could
fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom, which
tend to support the findings and judgment; and
that upon our review of the record in that light,
if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to
support them they will not be disturbed.
In Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, infra, defendant con-
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tended that the evidence "compelled" a finding for the defendant on his claim of breach of warranty.

In rejecting

this contention this court said:
[I]t would not be sufficient that there is
merely some evidence which would support such
a finding. Only if the evidence is such that
all reasonable minds would be so persuaded
would we reverse the trial court and rule as
a matter of law that a warranty was given and
breached. Conversely, if there is any basis
in the evidence upon which the trial court
could fairly and reasonably remain unconvinced
of those facts, the refusal to so find must
be sustained.
This court chose not to look at select testimony in isolation
but instead chose to "survey it in composite with all of
the evidence in the case".

417 P.2d at 135.

In light of

all the evidence, the court found the defendant's position
to be unsupported.
Finally in Staples Excavation & Erection Co. v. Wehyer
Const. Co., 26 Utah 2d 387, 490 P.2d 330, 333 (1971) where
plaintiff sought to recover the value of labor and materials
furnished in the construction of an office building, the
trial court made findings in which it concluded that plaintiff had failed to prove that its costs were reasonable and
so it dismissed the complaint.

Both plaintiff and defendant

sought review and the appellant contended that the court had
erred in disregarding uncontested testimony and that the re-

-23-
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cord did not support the findings of the court.

In consider-

ing these contentions this court recognized that it was
"asked to review issues of fact rather than issues of law",
but concluded that the trial court could reasonably and
fairly have been convinced in its findings and so refused to
upset the lower court's findings unless they were "arbitrary"
or without any "basis in the record".

Because the evidence

was in conflict the Staples court held:

"The decision of

the trial court having been made upon disputed and contradictory evidence, it would appear that the rule we have unundated in numerous cases, that the trial court being in an
advantaged position from having heard the testimony of the
witnesses and observed their demeanor is better able to
determine issues of fact than is this court upon a written
record."

In like fashion, this court should uphold the

findings of the trial court below, because at worst the
evidence is in dispute.
There was substantial evidence introduced at trial to
support the findings of the trial court.
Even if appellant should be permitted to raise objections on appeal which were not raised in the court below,
and even if this court should permit a review of those objections, despite appellant's failure to move for a new trial
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and permit correction at the trial level, this court must
conclude that the evidence produced at trial, when evaluated
in light of the standards and preferences established by
this court, was sufficient to sustain the trial court's
findings and conclusions.
In finding number 44, the court below found that Leger
had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the failure to complete the work within the time specified was due to the fault or negligence of the defendant.
Appellant contends that this was error because the "fault or
negligence" standard went to the criteria for determining an
extension of time and not to the issue of breach of contract.

Again, this argument misses the point. Admittedly,

the failure to perform a binding contractual promise results
in a breach of contract, I Restatement, Contracts §1 (1932),
but the words of the agreement must be interpreted to uncover the promises which are exchanged and bargained for.
The words of the whole agreement reflect the intentions of
the private bargaining parties; it is this intention which a
court of law must search out and enforce.

By the terms of

the agreement between the parties in the instant case, it
was agreed that any delays which were not due to the fault
or negligence of Roberts would warrant an extension of time.
The parties in their agreement contemplated that innocent
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delay would not cause injury to either party and would be
permissible.

When the trial court found that Leger had not

proved that the delay was due to the fault or negligence of
Roberts, it was, in essence, finding that any delay attributable to Roberts was of a kind which the parties had
previously agreed to as being permissible.

Leger could not,

on the one hand, claim that innocent delay was justification
for damages, and on the other hand, admit by the terms of
its own agreement that the same innocent delay would have
warranted an extension of time.

Therefore, the finding of

the trial court was not error but was extremely meaningful
and material in light of the nature of the agreement between
the parties.
Appellant contends that Finding of Fact number 39 (R.
p. 38) is irrelevant and incompetent.

This finding was

based upon the testimony of George Leger to the effect that
the installation of radiant heating pads at plaintiff's road
shed job in Lehi took the same amount of time as defendant's
installation at Salt Lake and Manila.

Appellant's argument

overlooks the fact that plaintiff elicited testimony from
George Leger based upon his "experience" as to how long it
should have taken to install the radiant heating pads in
question (Tr. 1st day, p. 11-12) . Thus, the basis of his
expertise was a legitimate subject of cross-examination and
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the time required on other jobs, a legitimate subject of
inquiry.
George Leger's testimony demonstrates that construction
of the heating pads at the Lehi shed, which was identical or
substantially similar to the Manila and Salt Lake sheds, did
not progress at a faster pace than did the construction at
Manila and Salt Lake.

The testimony was within the scope of

the witness1s "expertise" and it illuminated the questions
of delay and responsibility for the delay.
Proof of the existence of other facts, the occurrence
of other events, or acts or conduct upon other occasions
which have a relevant and material bearing upon the fact in
issue is admissable, Firlotte v. Jessee, 172 P.2d 710,
76 C.A.2d 207 (1946), and the admission of such evidence
is a matter which rests largely in the trial courtfs discretion.

Coyswell v. C. C. Anderson Stores Co., 68 Idaho

205, 192 P.2d 383, 389 (1948); See, Panitz v. Orenge, 518
P.2d 726, 10 Wash.App. 317 (1973).

A trial judge's deter-

mination should not be reversed absent a showing of abuse
of discretion.

Frame v. Bauman, 449 P.2d 525, 530, 202 Kan.

461 (1969).
In a related context, this court has allowed testimony
of a sales manager concerning the warranty policy of a tire

-27-
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seller as having probative value on the issue of the existence of a warranty in a particular sale.

Super Tire

Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132, 135
(1966).

In other contexts, this court has allowed the

introduction of evidence concerning the value of reasonably
comparable or sufficiently similar property when the value
of other property is in dispute.

E.g., Sweeny v. Happy

Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126, 129-30 (1966);
Salt Lake City v. Lewis, 30 Utah 2d 462, 519 P.2d 1344, 1345
(1974); see, Salt Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 452
P.2d 869, 870-71 (1969).

Even if testimony concerning work

at the Lehi shed was circumstantial, such testimony can be
used alone or with direct evidence to support a judgment.
E.g., Rothman v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 7 Wash.App. 453,
500 P.2d 1288, 1290 (1972); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick,
418 P.2d 900, 917 (Oka. 1965).

It should be noted that no

objection was made at trial to this testimony (Tr. 1st day,
pp. 58-59).

Appellant should not be allowed to raise his

objection to the admission of evidence for the first time at
this stage in the proceedings.

Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evi-

dence, specifically provides:
A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a)
there appears of record objection to the
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evidence timely interposed and so stated as
to make clear the specific ground of objection,, and (b) the court which passes upon
the effect of the error or errors is of the
opinion that the admitted evidence should
have been excluded on the ground stated and
probably had a substantial influence in
bringing about the verdict or finding. However, the court in its discretion, and in
the interests of justice, may review the
erroneous admission of evidence even though
the grounds of the objection thereto are not
correctly stated. (Emphasis added).
The appellant neither objected to the introduction of the
evidence nor sought to amend the findings of fact with respect thereto.

Even if a timely objection had been raised,

the error, if any, would at most be harmless.

See Startin v.

Madsen, 130 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834, 836 (1951).
In the interest of conserving time and space, respondent
will briefly indicate the portions of the record which support
the Findings of Fact which appellant disputes.
Finding of Fact number 34 - Transcript 1st day, pp.
67-68.
Finding of Fact number 35 - Transcript 1st day, pp.
50.
Finding of Fact number 36 - Transcript 2nd day, pp.
42-43, 46; pp. 74-76.
Finding of Fact number 37 - Exhibits, 17-P, 18-P and
19-P.
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Finding of Fact number 41 - Exhibit 46-P; Transcript
2nd day, pp. 37-38.
Finding of Fact number 42 - Transcript 1st day, pp. 6467.
Finding of Fact number 43 - Transcript 1st day, p. 50,
p. 12.
Finding of Fact number 45 - Exhibit 12-D, Transcript
1st day, pp. 64-68.
Finding of Fact number 46 - Transcript 2nd day, pp. 4243, 46, 74-75.
Finding of Fact number 47 states that "Leger did not
establish the number of calendar days of delay, if any,
caused by Roberts on the Salt Lake road shed."

A review of

the record shows a lack of evidence on this point.
Ill .
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S
FEES.
In its amended judgment, the trial court awarded Roberts
the amount of $2,607.50 for attorney's fees.

The fees were

assessed pursuant to U.C.A. §14-1-8 which provides:
In any action brought upon either of the bonds
provided herein, or against the public body
failing to obtain the delivery of the payment
bond, the prevailing party, upon each separate
cause of action, shall recover a reasonable
attorney's fee to be taxed as costs. (Emphasis added).
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As found by the court, the instant action fell within the
scope of §14-1-8 and since Roberts was the prevailing party,
the court awarded it reasonable attorney's fees.
Appellant does not dispute the applicability of this
statute nor the reasonableness of the fee assessed.

The

only contentions of the appellant are (1) that the fee was
improperly assessed as part of the judgment rather than as
a cost of suit, and (2) that the court made no finding that
Roberts was the "prevailing" party.
The obvious intent of the legislature in enacting
Section 14-1-8 was to provide adequate compensation to a
successful party who was forced to sue for the recovery of
payments due under a prime contract. Without the recovery
of attorney's fees, the successful subcontractor would only
recover an amount equal to his contract price less his attorney's fees, thereby substantially reducing the value of
his bargain under the contract.
Since the purpose of Section 14-1-8 is to provide "just
compensation", it should make little difference whether
attorney's fees are assessed as part of the judgment or as
costs.

In either event, the fee must be paid by the losing

party to fully compensate the subcontractor.
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To rely on

meaningless distinctions between "costs" and "judgments" in
the instant case would serve no useful purpose.

The only

meaningful question is the reasonableness of such fee which
appellant does not dispute.
Appellant has relied on Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, in support of its proposition that, as
costs, the fees were not included in defendant's memorandum
of costs and should be disallowed.

In Walker Bank and Trust

Co. v. New York Terminal Warehouse Co., 10 Utah 2d 210, 350
P.2d 626, 630-31 (I960), this court disallowed costs to a
plaintiff who failed to file a "verified" memorandum of
costs within five (5) days as required by the rule.

In the

instant case, the defendant filed his verified memorandum of
costs on March 19, 1975 (R. pp. 42-43), the same day judgment
was entered (R. pp. 25-26).

The findings of fact and con-

clusions of law were amended to include attorney's fees on
May 23, 1974 (R. pp. 15-16), when the amended judgment was
also entered (R. pp. 8-10).

The amended judgment was rendered

after hearing pursuant to defendant's motion (R. pp. 23-24)
requesting a finding and judgment relating to attorney's
fees.

Defendant claimed that the court had overlooked the

provisions of Section 41-1-8 and the court agreed.

Testimony

and an exhibit regarding attorney's fees was presented at
the trial (Tr. 2nd day, p. 129, Tr. 3rd day, pp. 1-5; Ex.
43-D).
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The purpose of Rule 54(d)(2) is twofold:

(1) to re-

lieve the trial court of the burden of taking testimony from
all parties in every case as to those items customarily
awarded as costs, viz., filing fees, costs of service of
complaints, subpoenas, etc., and (2) to give the party
against whom costs are awarded an opportunity to have those
items presented to the court under oath and subject to
challenge.

It is customary for those entitled to and seeking

attorney's fees in Utah courts to present their claim at
trial by way of sworn testimony as was done in this case.
Appellant was entitled to and did cross examine defendant's
witness.

Appellant would then have this testimony repeated

in the memorandum of costs.

This procedure would unduly bur-

den the trial court and burden the record on appeal with duplicate written and oral testimony.
As a second ground for the denial of attorney's fees,
appellant contends that the trial court made no finding
that the defendant was the "prevailing party" under Section
14-1-8, and that, since certain offsets were awarded to the
appellant, both parties were "prevailing parties".

In sup-

port of this position, appellant relies on the decision
of Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 (1966)
where this court refused to reverse the decision of the
trial judge with respect to the award of attorney's fees
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under U.C.A. §§38-1-17 to 18. This court in Shupe, however, did not base its decision on the fact that plaintiff
was not a prevailing party, but instead said:

"Viewing the

overall picture of this case in the light most favorable to
the facts as found by the jury and to the verdict and judgment, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion
in rejecting defendant's contentions."

(Emphasis added).

Id. 417 P.2d at 249.
A finding that defendant was the prevailing party is
certainly implicit in finding of fact number 52 (R. p. 16)
which indicates that defendant was entitled to attorney's
fees under the provisions of §14-1-8.
The decision to award attorney's fees pursuant to an
authorizing statute is one which lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.

This court has refused to reverse

the trial court's decision with respect to a reasonable
attorney's fee in the absence of abuse of that discretion.
In re Smith's Estate, 162 P.2d 105, 111 108 Utah 537 (1945).
Costs and attorney's fees are assumed to be reasonable unless
there is clear evidence to the contrary.

See Jenkins v.

Jenkins, 153 P.2d 262, 264-65, 107 Utah 239 (1944).

In the

case below, the defendant was awarded judgment on its first
claim contained in the counterclaim, while plaintiff's claim

-34-
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was denied.

Even though certain set-offs were awarded to

the plaintiff, it was in the trial court's sound discretion
to hold that, as a whole, the defendant was the prevailing
party.

The fact that defendant was not entitled to recover

the full amount of its claim does not preclude the trial
court from finding that it had nevertheless prevailed.
Appellant relies on the decision of Malvo v. J.C.
Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973) for the proposition that fees should not be awarded where to do so would
result in a penalty.

The Malvo court, however, did not

say that the award of attorney's fees should be voided as
a penalty, but only that the automatic award of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party is "manifestly unreasonable".
Id. at 587.

In fact, the Malvo court reiterated that "a

party does not have to prevail on all of the issues in the
case to be a 'prevailing party1" [citations omitted] Id.
at 586.

The court also bolstered its prior rulings which

recognized the wide discretion of the trial judge in the
award of attorney's fees.

Id.

The main concern of the

Malvo court was to insure that when attorney's fees are
awarded they are "reasonable" and properly awarded as
"partial compensation" to the prevailing party.

While

holding that the fees awarded in the lower court were

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-35-

not compensatory, the court did state that:
Where there is evidence that a losing party
did not have a good faith claim or defense,
and all the fees incurred by the prevailing
party were justified, a judge might well
choose to award the full amount of the fees
requested. 512 P.2d at 588.
It is clear that in the case below, the award of
attorney's fees was justified as partial compensation for
the recovery of the payments due to the defendant.

These

fees were reasonable, just and undisputed; they should be
allowed in accordance with the statute under which they
were assessed,
IV
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY DID NOT FILE A
NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME AND MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW AND IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT AS A PARTY
APPELLANT.
The appellant represents that those parties seeking
relief in this proceeding are "[p]laintiff and plaintiff for
and on behalf of its surety."

(Appellant's brief, p. 2 ) .

Yet, the only party that has preserved its right to appeal
is Leger Construction Company, for only Leger has filed a
notice of appeal.
Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, establishes
the procedure for taking an appeal.

This rule permits an

appeal "from a district court to the Supreme Court" within
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"one month from the entry of judgment or order appealed
from."

(Emphasis added).

The only exception from compliance

with this time limitation is "a showing of excusable neglect
based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the
judgment."

(Emphasis added).

The rule goes on to say that

"a party may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district
court a notice of appeal . . * and depositing therewith the
fee required for docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court."
(Emphasis added).

Subpart (b) of Rule 73 sets forth the re-

quirements of the notice which "shall specify the parties
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from; and shall designate that the appeal is
taken to the Supreme Court" (Emphasis added).

Notification

of the filing by serving a copy thereof "on all the parties
to the judgment" is also required.

This rule serves to in-

form the court and an adverse party of the pendency of an
appeal and, in particular, of those parties that are making
the appeal.
The judgment of the district court was "joint and several"
as against Leger Construction Company and its surety United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Corporation (USF&G).

Each party

had an opportunity to appeal the judgment by complying with
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

-37-

The notice of appeal
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which was filed by Leger on June 25, 1974, states in full:
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Leger Construction, Inc., and hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the Amended Judgment entered herein
on the 23rd day of May, 1974, and all proceedings thereafter up to the filing of this Notice
of Appeal.
The verb tense of this notice is in the singular and clearly
indicates that only one party sought appeal.

Even the cap-

tion of the notice fails to designate United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Company as an appellant.

This notice fails to

indicate that any other party, except Leger, was making an
appeal.
The timely filing of an appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite, E.g., Allen v. Garner, 45 Utah 39, 143 P.228 (1914);
Sorenson v. Korsgaard, 83 Utah 177, 27 P.2d 439 (1933), as
is the filing of a proper and sufficient notice of appeal,
E.g. Johnston v. Geary, 84 Utah 47, 33 P.2d 757 (1934);
Anderson v. Halthusen Mercantile Co., 30 Utah 31, 83 P* 560
(1906).

In this case USF&G has not filed a notice of appeal

and is bound by the judgment below.

This court has no juris-

diction to rule with respect to USF&G's liability to Roberts.
[See, 9 Moore's Federal Practice, 1(203.09 for discussion of
the requirement of filing notice as jurisdictional and mandatory to preserve appeal].
While there is apparently no Utah decision which dis-
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cusses the precise question now before the court, this court's
language in Allen v. Garner, supra, is illuminating and
should serve as a guide for decision.

In Allen, the appel-

lant failed to serve notice on a joint maker and defendant
of a note upon which judgment was rendered.

This court held

there that the notice of appeal requirement was jurisdictional,
and said:
The question that confronts us here, however, is, Can parties confer jurisdiction upon
this court to hear appeals by waiving notice of
appeal or by entering their appearance at any
time after the time for an appeal has expired?
If the question is one merely of regularity or
jurisdiction over the person, then, of course,
we might permit an omitted party to enter his
appearance at any time before the case is finally
submitted, but if it is jurisdictional in the
sense that it affects the power of this court
to hear and determine the appeal, then, as a matter of course, the parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent. We think the question is
jurisdictional in the sense just stated. 143
P.2d at 229.
Other state courts that have examined the jurisdictional
issue of a party's failure to file a notice of appeal agree
that such a failure precludes an appellate court's jurisdiction.

In Hayes v. Hagemuir, 75 N.M.70, 400 P.2d 945 (1963)

a minor and her mother were denied relief in an action for
personal injuries.

Only the minor filed a notice of appeal

which was singular in form and only mentioned the minor as
appellant.

The court held that it did not have jurisdiction
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to hear the appeal as it applied to the mother.

In Sloan v.

Sheridan, 161 Kan. 425, 168 P.2d 545 (1946) one of two defendants filed a notice of appeal, but judgment was rendered
against both of them, and plaintiff caused the judgment to
be executed against the defendant who did not file notice of
appeal.

The court held that the notice was not sufficient

to constitute a notice o>f appeal for both defendants, and
that the plaintiff was authorized in his attempt to execute
the judgment against the defendant who had not filed notice.
The Federal courts are also in agreement with this
position.

In Cook and Sons Equipment, Inc. v. Killen, 277 F

607, 609 (9th Cir. 1960), where only the corporate defendant
and not the individual defendants filed a notice of appeal,
the court refused to grant the individual defendant's motion
to have their names added to the notice of appeal on the
ground that the omission was a "clerical error".

The court

said:
The omission here was much more than a
clerical error. It was a failure of the individual defendants to appeal. We have no
authority to amend a notice of appeal so as
to bring in additional parties. Appellant
relies on Rule 75(h) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. That rule has
no application in the instant situation. It
applies to errors in the contents of a record.
Rule 73(b) requires that the notice of appeal
specify the parties taking the appeal. Only
the parties named in the notice of appeal are
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brought within the appellate court's jurisdiction. VII Moore, Federal Practice
(2d ed. 1955) §§73.13, 73.14. The harmless
error doctrine has no application of failure
to name parties in a notice of appeal. Penwell v. Newland, 9 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 551.
The motion to amend the notice of appeal so
as to include additional parties is denied.
In Van Hoose v. Edison, 450 F.2d 746, 747 (6th Cir.
1971), where a group of students appealed from an order
denying them relief from a suspension for violations of the
school "Student and Employee Hair Code," the Notice of
Appeal was entitled "Floyd Van Hoose, et al. M . The court
refused to recognize any other party other than Van Hoose as
properly before the court saying,
We are satisfied that the only appellant
in this case is Floyd Van Hoose. Rule 3(c) ,
Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires in part:
"The notice of appeal shall specify the party
or parties taking the appeal." The only party
specified in the notice of appeal filed in this
case was Floyd Van Hoose. The term "et al" does
not inform any other party or any court as to
which of the plaintiffs desire to appeal in this
case. This is more than a clerical error. Cook
and Soons Equipment, Inc. v. Killen, 277 F.2d
607 (9th Cir., 1960); Penwell v. Newland, 180
F.2d 551 (9th Cir., 1950); 9 Moorefs Federal
Practice (2nd Ed. 1970) Section 203.17.
And, in McKinney v. Debord, 507 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1974) a
group of defendants appealed from an adverse summary judgment but only one defendant, McKinney, actually signed the
notice of appeal.

The court dismissed the appeal with

-41-
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respect to the other defendants because they had not signed.
Finally, it is too late for plaintiff to seek the
joinder of USF&G under Rule 74(a), U.R.C.P..

That rule

applies only to parties who have otherwise taken steps to
preserve their appeal.

The Compilerfs Notes to Rule 74(a)

indicate that the rule was patterned after Rule 74 of the
Federal Rules, now Rule 3(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In commenting on Rule 3(b), Moore states:

Only a party who hcis filed a timely notice of
appeal may join in the appeal of another. . . .
Rule 3(b) does not permit one who has not filed
a timely notice of appeal to become an appellant
by joining in appeal with one who has filed a
timely notice.
9, Moore's Federal Practice, 1(203.13 (1974).
Only Leger Construction Company is a proper party
before this court and the judgment of the district court
with respect to the liability of USF&G is binding.

This

court is without jurisdiction to upset that judgment as it
applies to USF&G.

Only Leger has satisfied the jurisdic-

tional requirement of filing a proper notice of appeal.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings of Fact
entered by the trial court are fully supported by competent
evidence and that the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.

The appellant failed to raise substantially
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all of the issues before the trial court which it seeks
to present here and under well-established principles of
law these matters should not be brought before this court
for the first time on appeal.

It is further submitted that

added defendant United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company
has not appealed from the judgment of the trial court and
that the judgment heretofore entered against it is final in
all respects.
Respectfully Submitted,

R. Mont McDowell
ROE AND FOWLER
34 0 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
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